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COMMENT
THE DEFENSE OF BATTERED WOMEN WHO KILL
Rocco C. CIPPARONE, JR.t
Domestic violence, particularly wife abuse,' is a pervasive prob-
lem: it plagues all levels of society, from the economically disadvantaged
to the rich, professional classes.2 Approximately twenty-five percent of
all murder victims are killed by close family members' and, in the ma-
jority of intrafamily cases, one spouse is killed by the other.4 Further-
more, it has been estimated that one-third to one-half of all women
who live with a male companion will experience some form of brutal-
ity, ranging from the threat of serious harm to actual torture, at the
hands of that companion.
5
The American legal system often has been criticized for its general
ineffectiveness in dealing with wife abuse and other forms of domestic
violence. In particular, several commentators have argued that the fail-
ure to adopt law enforcement policies that emphasize intervention
before domestic violence reaches the point of homicide has contributed
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Pennsylvania.
I The term "wife abuse" will be used throughout this Comment to refer to abuse
of both women who are married to their mates and women who live with their abusers
but are not married to them. Similarly, the terms "battered wife" and "battered wo-
man" will be used interchangeably.
2 See L. WALKER, THE BATTERED WOMAN 21-25 (1979) [hereinafter L.
WALKER 1979]; Comment, The Battered Wife's Dilemma: To Kill or To Be Killed, 32
HASTINGS L.J. 895, 896 (1981).
S See J. FLEMING, STOPPING WIFE ABUSE 155 (1979); Meyers, Battered Wives,
Dead Husbands, STUDENT LAW., Mar. 1978, at 46, 47; A Killing Excuse, TIME,
Nov. 28, 1977, at 108.
4 See J. FLEMING, supra note 3, at 155 (In over 50% of intrafamily killings, one
spouse kills the other. In 52% of such killings, the husband is the killer.).
5 See L. WALKER 1979, supra note 2, at 19-20; Schneider, Equal Rights to Trial
For Women: Sex Bias in the Law of Self-Defense, 15 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 623,
624-25 (1980); see also UNrrD STATES COMMISSION ON CIVIL RIGHTS, UNDER THE
RULE OF THUMB: BATTERED WOMEN AND THE ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE 1
(1982) (estimating that there are well over one million battered wives in this country
and that spousal violence occurs in one out of three marriages); Meyers, supra note 3,
at 47 ("Estimates of U.S. families harboring wife abuse range from a low of 3 million
to a high of 40 million.").
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to the escalation of wife abuse." Unfortunately, until improved policies
are adopted and take effect, a battered woman's first contact with the
legal system may be as a criminal defendant.
This Comment explores the defense in a criminal trial of a bat-
tered woman who has killed her batterer. In recent years, numerous
battered women have presented a plea of self-defense to a charge of
criminal homicide and have sought to introduce, in support of this
claim, expert testimony with respect to the typical characteristics of
women who have been exposed to a pattern of abuse by their male
companions.7 These characteristics are collectively and commonly re-
ferred to as the "battered woman syndrome," 8 and courts have become
increasingly receptive to expert testimony concerning the syndrome.'
Despite the admissibility of such expert testimony, there are many
situations in which a battered woman defendant will have difficulty
establishing a claim of self-defense in light of the traditional formula-
tion and interpretation of the elements of self-defense.
While some commentators have argued that the law of self-defense
should be modified to accommodate factual situations that do not satisfy
the traditional self-defense standard, 0 it is unlikely, given the long-
standing history of the law of self-defense, that such a modification will
occur in the near future."1 In the interim, a battered woman who has
I See J. FLEMING, supra note 3, at 152-56; S. SCHECHTER, WOMEN AND MALE
VIOLENCE 157-83 (1982); Roy, Some Thoughts Regarding the Criminal Justice System
and Wifebeating, in BATTERED WOMEN 138-39 (M. Roy ed. 1977); Eisenberg & Sey-
mour, The Self-Defense Plea and Battered Women, TRIAL, July, 1978, at 34; Com-
ment, supra note 2, at 902-17; Note, Does Wife Abuse Justify Homicide?, 24 WAYNE
L. REV. 1705, 1710-14 (1978).
' See, e.g., Ibn-Tamas v. United States, 407 A.2d 626 (D.C. 1979) (finding that
expert testimony on battered women did not invade the province of the jury); People v.
Minnis, 118 Ill. App. 3d 345, 455 N.E.2d 209 (1983) (holding that exclusion of testi-
mony on the battered woman syndrome was reversible error); People v. White, 90 Ill.
App. 3d 1067, 414 N.E.2d 196 (1980) (excluding expert testimony on battered women
as irrelevant); State v. Thomas, 66 Ohio St. 2d 518, 423 N.E.2d 137 (1981) (affirming
the exclusion by the trial court of expert testimony on the battered woman syndrome).
s L. WALKER, THE BATTERED WOMAN SYNDROME (1984) [hereinafter L.
WALKER 1984] is perhaps the most thorough discussion of the syndrome.
9 See, e.g., Ibn-Tamas, 407 A.2d 626. In each of the following cases, the court
concluded that exclusion of testimony on the battered woman syndrome was reversible
error. See Smith v. State, 247 Ga. 612, 277 S.E.2d 678 (1981); Minnis, 118 IL. App.
3d 345, 455 N.E.2d 209; State v. Anaya, 438 A.2d 892 (Me. 1981); State v. Kelly, 97
N.J. 178, 478 A.2d 364 (1984); State v. Kelly, 102 Wash. 2d 188, 685 P.2d 564
(1984).
10 See, e.g., Note, Limits on the Use of Defensive Force to Prevent Intramarital
Assaults, 10 RuT.-CAM. L.J. 643 (1979) (proposing a standard that eliminates the
elements of imminence and duty to retreat and introduces the element of necessity).
" See, e.g., Rittenmeyer, Of Battered Wives, Self-Defense and Double Standards
ofJustice, 9 J. CRIM. JUST. 389, 392 (1981) ("To advocate.., a radical change [in the
law of self-defense] by means of judicial action is at least a cavalier response to a
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killed her batterer-but who cannot establish the traditional elements
of a self-defense claim-faces the prospect of a criminal homicide con-
viction. This Comment advocates that in such a situation a battered
woman should consider presenting a defense of temporary insanity as
an alternative to a claim of self-defense. In particular situations, the
former will have a greater possibility of success than the latter.1
2
Part I of this Comment chronicles the phases of a typical battering
relationship and describes the battered woman syndrome. Part II
presents the traditional and most common formulation of the legal ele-
ments of self-defense and discusses situations in which a self-defense
plea by a battered woman who has killed her batterer is likely to be
successful. The discussion then turns to situations wherein such a plea
by a battered woman is likely to be unsuccessful. Part III advocates the
presentation of a defense of temporary insanity by a battered woman
for whom a claim of self-defense is likely to be unsuccessful. Part IV
addresses the potential ramifications of presenting a temporary insanity
defense-particularly the possibility of commitment to a mental health
facility after an acquittal by reason of insanity-and argues that for the
battered woman so acquitted, this possibility can be minimized.
I. THE BATTERING RELATIONSHIP AND THE BATTERED WOMAN
SYNDROME
A. The Battering Cycle and its Phases
In many cases, the defense of a battered woman accused of crimi-
nal homicide will be strengthened if the defendant can establish that
she has been subjected to the cyclical pattern of physical and psycholog-
ical abuse now commonly referred to as the "battered woman syn-
drome." Dr. Lenore Walker, perhaps the foremost authority on the
syndrome,"3 has described the recurring stages of violence that charac-
recently discovered social phenomenon, and at most, an argument for usurpation of the
democratic prerogative by the judiciary.").
12 Implicit in the argument for an alternative defense for battered women who kill
in a situation in which the traditional requirements of self-defense are not met is the
belief that most battered women who have killed their batterers should not be punished
for their actions solely because the elements of self-defense as traditionally and pres-
ently formulated cannot be established.
23 Dr. Walker is a licensed psychologist whose description of the battered woman
syndrome is based on her studies of and interviews with battered women. See L.
WALKER 1984, supra note 8, at 1-4. Dr. Walker has also testified as an expert witness
in numerous spousal homicide cases, including Ibn-Tamas v. United States, 407 A.2d
626, 631 (D.C. 1979); Hawthorne v. State, 408 So. 2d 801, 805 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1982), and is an often cited authority on the subject. See, e.g., Kelly, 97 N.J. at 193-95,
478 A.2d at 371-72.
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terize a battering relationship.'4 The battering cycle has three distinct
phases: a period of tension-building, followed by an acute battering in-
cident, which is in turn followed by a period of calm, loving respite.1
5
Phase one, the tension building stage, is characterized by "minor"
battering incidents, during which the woman, in order to prevent the
violence from escalating, attempts to be as complacent as possible.1
6
Battered women report that during this phase the psychological torture
is more difficult to handle than the physical harm.' 7 In fact, many bat-
tered women report that the psychological effects of the battering rela-
tionship are more devastating and debilitating than the severe physical
injuries that they often sustain.' 8
Phase two, the acute battering incident, is characterized by an un-
controllable discharge of tensions that have built up during phase one."9
The batterer typically goes into a blind rage and frequently inflicts se-
vere physical injury upon the woman.2 0 Usually, some external event or
internal state of the batterer himself triggers the acute battering inci-
dent.2 ' The woman, however, may occasionally provoke a phase two
incident: in some situations, as the terror and anxiety produced in the
first stage increase to unbearable levels, the battered woman would
rather endure an acute battering incident than live in fear of its unpre-
dictable yet certain onset. Furthermore, she may wish to expedite the
completion of the second phase in order to reach the phase of calm,
loving respite, which her previous experiences with the battering cycle
have led her to expect. 22 Although the violence that occurs during phase
two often takes various forms, the result-as in phase one-is severe
psychological stress for the woman. "She does not feel the [physical]
pain as much as she feels psychologically trapped and unable to flee the
situation. 23
"I See L. WALKER 1979, supra note 2, at 56-70; L. WALKER 1984, supra note 8,
at 95-97; see also State v. Gallegos, 104 N.M. 247, -, 719 P.2d 1268, 1271 (N.M. Ct.
App. 1986) (discussing "predictable patterns" of domestic violence).
"s See L. WALKER 1979, supra note 2, at 55.
16 See id. at 56.
17 See id. at 59.
aS See id. at 7, 72; L. WALKER 1984, supra note 8, at 26; see also Gallegos, 104
N.M. at -, 719 P.2d at 1271 (describing the battering relationship as a "hopeless
vacuum of 'cumulative terror").
19 See L. WALKER 1979, supra note 2, at 59; see also State v. Kelly, 97 N.J. 178,
193, 478 A.2d 364, 371 (1984) (describing the transition from phase one to phase two
of the battering cycle).
20 See L. WALKER 1979, supra note 2, at 60.
21 See id; see also State v. Gallegos, 104 N.M. 247, -, 719 P.2d 1268, 1271
(N.M. Ct. App. 1986) (citing drunkenness and jealousy as examples of factors which
motivate a man to initiate a battering episode).
22 See L. WALKER 1979, supra note 2, at 62.
13 Id. at 61-62 (emphasis added); see also L. WALKER 1984, supra note 8, at 26
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The third and "final" stage is characterized by kind, contrite, and
loving behavior on the part of the batterer, who, realizing that he has
gone too far, attempts to reconcile himself to the woman.24 The batterer
is convinced, and the woman convinces herself, that the violence will
not recur.25 The man's loving behavior, and the woman's belief that
such behavior will continue, often persuade a battered woman to re-
main with her batterer. Inevitably, however, the period of loving respite
ends and merges into a period of minor battering. The cycle begins
again.28
B. Characteristics of Battered Women
27
Several characteristics are common among women who have been
subjected to repeated physical and psychological abuse by their mates.
These traits relate to the state of mind of battered women and the typi-
cal ways in which such women react to various situations. A battered
woman commonly experiences feelings of low self-esteem. In fact, she
often blames herself for the batterer's behavior.28 It is also common for
a battered woman to experience severe stress reactions such as anxiety,
depression, fear, and general suspiciousness. She often believes that no
one, including even herself, will be able to resolve her predicament.
This feeling of helplessness stems from, among other things, society's
reluctance to involve itself in marital affairss° and the batterer's con-
(stating that battered women repeatedly asserted in interviews "that the psychological
degradation and humiliation was [sic] the most painful abuse they suffered").
24 See L. WALKER 1979, supra note 2, at 65.
25 See id. at 65-67.
26 See id. at 69.
17 Exactly how many times a woman must be subjected to physical abuse by her
male companion in order to be considered a battered woman is debatable. For purposes
of her research, Dr. Walker considered any woman who had been through the bat-
tering cycle at least twice to be a battered woman. See L. WALKER 1979, supra note 2,
at xv. Whether a woman is suffering from the effects of the battered woman syndrome
should be a question of fact to be resolved at trial.
28 See L. WALKER 1979, supra note 2, at 31-35 (listing nine characteristics of
battered women); see also J. FLEMING, supra note 3, at 81-95 (noting that characteris-
tics common among battered women include emotional and economic dependence, and
adherence to traditional value systems, and that battered women often feel guilt, isola-
tion, fear, ambivalence, shame, and helplessness); L. WALKER 1984, supra note 8, at
75-85 (presenting the results of a psychological study of battered women).
2 See L. WALKER 1979, supra note 2, at 31-35; see also J. FLEMING, supra note
3, at 81-95.
3O See, e.g., State v. Kelly, 97 N.J. 178, 192, 478 A.2d 364, 370 (1984) (discuss-
ing the unwillingness of law enforcement agencies to pursue wife beating cases); see
also Gelles, No Place to Go: The Social Dynamics of Marital Violence, in BAT'rERED
WOMEN, supra note 6, at 46, 55-57 (describing third parties' reactions to spousal vio-
lence); Comment, supra note 2, at 897-99 (describing the historical view that a hus-
band had a right to discipline his wife).
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stant reinforcement of the notions that he is the dominant figure in the
relationship and that she is totally dependent upon him and him
alone."1
Psychologists have applied the social learning theory of "learned
helplessness" as a rationale for behavioral patterns such as those com-
mon among battered women." As applied to wife beating, the theory of
learned helplessness predicts that a woman who is repeatedly beaten by
her male companion will eventually accept the battering behavior as
unavoidable and thus will develop a feeling of helplessness.33 Once this
feeling of helplessness takes root, the battered woman frequently gener-
alizes her inability to control the beatings into a feeling of helplessness
with regard to all aspects of her relationship with the batterer3, The
process of victimization experienced by a battered woman may be per-
petuated to the point of psychological paralysis: even where options of
escape or avoidance exist, the woman may be unable to act on or even
perceive the existence of such options.
3 5
II. SELF-DEFENSE AND THE BATTERED WOMAN WHO KILLS
Battered women who have killed their batterers increasingly are
asserting claims of self-defense.3" In many instances, such a defense will
Si See L. WALKER 1979, supra note 2, at 11-13 (surveying patriarchal societal
conventions and the expressions of such conventions by batterers).
" See J. FLEMING, supra note 3, at 93 (In the seminal learned helplessness ex-
periments, animals subjected to repeated and nonconditional pain stimuli "learned" to
ignore avenues of escape, even when escape was made readily available.).
88 See id. at 93-95; L. WALKER 1979, supra note 2, at 48-50; see also L.
WALKER 1984, supra note 8, at 86-94 (applying the theory of learned helplessness to
battered wives).
" See L. WALKER 1979, supra note 2, at 47-50 (Battered women frequently ex-
press the sentiment: "No matter what I do, I have no influence."). Id. at 50.
85 See id. at 43; see also J. FLEMING, supra note 3, at 94 (noting that a woman's
perceptions need not be accurate for the theory of learned helplessness to work); L.
WALKER 1984, supra note 8, at 86 (noting that, like studies of animals, studies of
humans have shown that perceptual distortions occur as the result of an inability to
predict the success of one's actions).
86 See Ibn-Tamas v. United States, 407 A.2d 626 (D.C. 1979); Ward v. State, 470
So. 2d 100 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1985); Terry v. State, 467 So. 2d 761 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1985); People v. Minnis, 118 Ill. App. 3d 345, 455 N.E.2d 209 (1983); People v.
White, 90 Ill. App. 3d 1067, 414 N.E.2d 196 (1980); State v. Hodges, 239 Kan. 63,
716 P.2d 563 (1986); State v. Kelly, 97 N.J. 178, 478 A.2d 364 (1984); State v. Gal-
legos, 104 N.M. 247, 719 P.2d 1268 (Ct. App. Ct. App. 1986); State v. Thomas, 66
Ohio St. 2d 518, 423 N.E.2d 137 (1981); State v. Hill, 287 S.C. 398, 339 S.E.2d 121
(1986). See generally Frank, Driven to Kill, A.B.A. J., Dec. 26, 1984, at 25, 26 (the.
battered woman syndrome is most commonly, presented as evidence in conjunction with
a self-defense plea); Comment, supra note 2, at 917-18 (attorneys have recently at-
tempted to assert justifiable homicide to exculpate women who fight back in self-
defense).
[Vol. 135:427
DEFENSE OF BATTERED WOMEN
be successful. In other situations, however, the circumstances surround-
ing the killing will not satisfy the traditional requirements of the law of
self-defense. This section of the Comment describes the traditional ele-
ments of self-defense and examines the circumstances under which a
battered woman who has killed her batterer will or will not be able to
maintain a successful claim of self-defense.
A. The Traditional Self-Defense Standard
The traditional legal standard justifying the use of deadly force
against another person is that the person who resorted to deadly force
must have had a reasonable belief (1) that she was faced with an immi-
nent threat of death or serious bodily harm, and (2) that deadly force
was necessary to avoid or prevent such harm.3 7 Furthermore, in many
jurisdictions the initial aggressor in an encounter may not use deadly
force in self-defense unless she has effectively withdrawn from the en-
counter and communicated her withdrawal to the other person.8 A
substantial minority of jurisdictions also require that there were no safe
avenues of retreat available to the person who resorted to deadly force
to repel an attack. 9 Within such jurisdictions, there is general agree-
ment that a person need not retreat from her home,40 although a few do
require retreat from the home-when it can be safely had-if the as-
sailant is a co-occupant of the home.41
37 See W. LAFAVE & A. Scorr, CRIMINAL LAW 454 (2d ed. 1986). Examples of
state statutes that embody the traditional legal standard include: Mo. ANN. STAT.
§ 563.031 (Vernon 1979); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:3-4a (West 1982); 18 PA. CONS.
STAT. ANN. § 505(a) (Purdon 1983).
1 See W. LAFAVE & A. ScorT, supra note 37, at 459-60. For examples of state
statutes requiring withdrawal and communication of withdrawal, see CONN. GEN.
STAT. ANN. § 53a-19(c) (West 1958); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 563.031 (Vernon 1979);
N.Y. PENAL LAW § 35.15(1)(b) (McKinney 1975).
39 See W. LAFAVE & A. ScoTT, supra note 37, at 460-61; Note, supra note 10,
at 653-54. Statutes containing this requirement include CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN.
§ 53a-19(b)(1) (West 1958); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 464(e)(2) (1979); N.H. REv.
STAT. ANN. § 627:4III(a) (1986); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:3-4(b) (West 1982); N.Y.
PENAL LAW § 35.15(2)(a) (McKinney Supp. 1986); 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN.
§ 505(b)(2)(ii) (Purdon 1983).
40 See W. LAFAVE & A. ScoTT, supra note 37, at 460-61; Note, supra note 10,
at 654. State statutes that generally do not require retreat from the home include
CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53a-19(b)(1) (West 1958); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11,
§ 464(e)(2)(a) (1979); N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 627:4III(a) (1986); N.J. STAT. ANN.
§ 2C:3-4(b)(2)(b)(i) (West 1982); N.Y. PENAL LAW § 35.15(2)(a)(i) (McKinney
Supp. 1986); 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 505(b)(2)(ii)(A) (Purdon 1983).
41 W. LAFAVE & A. Scorr, supra note 37, at 461; Note, supra note 10, at 654.
Examples of statutes that require retreat from the home when the assailant is a co-
occupant are N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:3-4(b)(2)(b)(i) (West 1982); 18 PA. CoNs. STAT.,
ANN. § 505 (b)(2)(ii)(A) (Purdon 1983).
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B. Situations in Which a Self-Defense Plea Is Appropriate for the
Battered Woman Who Has Killed Her Batterer
In many situations, the circumstances under which a battered wo-
man killed her batterer will have been such that she will have little
difficulty satisfying the traditional self-defense standard. In fact, in
some cases, the battered woman defendant will be able to obtain an
acquittal on self-defense grounds even without presenting evidence that
in the past she had been assaulted repeatedly by the victim. Neverthe-
less, such evidence will usually be helpful in convincing the trier of fact
that the defendant reasonably believed that she faced an imminent
threat of death or serious bodily harm and that resort to deadly force
was necessary under the circumstances.
The situation in which a battered woman's self-defense claim is
most likely to be successful is one in which the defendant has killed her
batterer during an acute battering incident. The severe bodily injury
usually inflicted upon the woman during such an incident would allevi-
ate any difficulty that the defendant might have in establishing that she
had a reasonable belief that she was faced with an imminent threat of
death or serious bodily harm at the particular instant at which she
killed her batterer. 2 Proof that she was faced with a present threat of
severe bodily injury satisfies the imminence requirement as it tradition-
ally has been interpreted.43 Furthermore, in light of the cyclical nature
of the battering relationship, the fact that the defendant had been seri-
ously injured in previous battering incidents reinforces the reasonable-
ness of her belief that such harm would again be inflicted upon her
during the particular attack in question. Courts have recognized that a
trier of fact, in determining the reasonableness of the defendant's belief
that she was threatened with imminent death or serious bodily harm,
may take into account all the circumstances surrounding a killing, in-
cluding the defendant's knowledge of prior violent acts by the victim."
41 See, e.g., People v. White, 90 Ill. App. 3d 1067, 1071, 414 N.E.2d 196, 200
(1980) (stating that a claim of self-defense turns upon what transpired during the "par-
ticular instant" at which the death was caused).
's See id.; see also People v. Dillon, 24 Ill. 2d 122, 126, 18 N.E.2d 503, 504
(1962) (emphasis added) ("The question is . . . whether the evidence shows that, at
this particular instant, her husband made an unprovoked assault upon her which put
her in reasonable fear of imminent death or great bodily harm which could only be
avoided by stabbing him."). See generally Rittenmeyer, supra note 11, at 391 (citing
commentators, cases, and statutes that interpret imminence as requiring the present
ability of the attacker to carry out a threat of death or serious bodily injury).
44 See, e.g., State v. Wanrow, 88 Wash. 2d 221, 236, 559 P.2d 548, 555 (1977)
(stating that facts and circumstances known to the defendant substantially before the
killing are admissible). See generally Schneider, supra note 5, at 641-44 (surveying
relevant cases).
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Similarly, a woman who has killed her batterer during an acute
battering incident usually will be able to show that it was reasonable
for her to believe that resort to deadly force was necessary to avoid the
threatened harm. The natural disparity in physical strength between
men and women and the relative lack of physical combat training of
women substantiate the reasonableness of the defendant's use of deadly
force.45 A battered woman who was unable to defend herself against
prior attacks by her batterer, thereby suffering severe bodily injury,
should be in a particularly good position to establish the reasonableness
of her resort to deadly force." In most cases, therefore, the imminence
and necessity requirements will not preclude a successful self-defense
claim by a battered woman who has killed her batterer during an
attack.
The retreat requirement that a minority of jurisdictions incorpo-
rate into their self-defense standard also will not preclude a successful
self-defense claim by a woman who has killed her batterer during an
attack. Because most of these jurisdictions do not require a person to
retreat from her own home, which is where most battering incidents
occur,47 a battered woman who has killed her batterer generally will be
able to assert successfully a claim of self-defense even if safe avenues of
retreat were available. Even in those jurisdictions that require retreat
from one's home when the attacker is a co-occupant, it is unlikely that
a battered woman who has killed her batterer during an attack in their
home will be hindered in presenting a claim of self-defense. The retreat
requirement has been interpreted to require retreat only when it "can
be effected 'with complete safety,' and indeed with knowledge that re-
treat can be so effected."" Complete safety is interpreted literally: a
person is not required to retreat if in doing so she would "endure any
45 See, e.g., Wanrow, 88 Wash. 2d at 240, 559 P.2d at 559 ("[Clare must be
taken to assure that our self-defense instructions afford women the right to have their
conduct judged in light of the individual physical handicaps which are the product of
sex discrimination."); see also Schneider, supra note 5, at 632-33 (arguing that a self-
defense standard should take into account the physical differences between men and
women, and also the general lack of physical combat training received by women in
comparison to that received by men).
46 See Comment, supra note 2, at 923 (arguing for recognition of prior battering
experiences as support for the reasonableness of a woman's resort to deadly force).
47 See L. WALKER 1984, supra note 8, at 25, 168-69 app. A, table 11 (demon-
strating that, among the battered women interviewed, the vast majority reported that
battering incidents began and ended in the home).
4, State v. Abbott, 36 N.J. 63, 75, 174 A.2d 881, 887 (1961) (emphasis added);
see also MODEL PENAL CODE § 3.04(2)(b)(ii) (1962) (stating that use of deadly force
is not justified if "the actor knows that he can avoid the necessity of using such force
with complete safety by retreating").
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[injury] at all," no matter how slight.'9 In determining whether a de-
fendant actually had and knew of an opportunity to escape with com-
plete safety, the trier of fact is to consider all the circumstances sur-
rounding the killing, "including the excitement." 50 For a battered
woman being violently attacked by the batterer in the close quarters of
her home, it is unlikely that there would be avenues of retreat available
to her such that she could escape without any harm whatsoever or, even
if there were, that she could have known of them under the circum-
stances. Therefore, a battered woman who has killed her batterer dur-
ing an acute battering incident would have a strong claim of self-
defense.
C. Situations in Which a Battered Woman Who Has Killed
Her Batterer Will Not Have a Strong Claim Under the Existing
Law of Self-Defense
While there is a good chance that a woman who killed her bat-
terer during an acute battering incident will be able to meet the re-
quirements of the self-defense standard, the utility of a self-defense
claim is limited to the relatively narrow range of facts discussed in the
preceding section. If, as often occurs, a woman has killed her batterer
during a lull in the beatings-such as when he was asleep 51 or when he
had his back turned52-a claim of self-defense is likely to be unsuccess-
ful. In particular, the current formulation of the imminence require-
ment will, in many situations, impede the success of self-defense claims
asserted by women who have killed their batterers 3
Under the current formulation of the self-defense standard, a de-
fendant asserting a claim of self-defense must show that she had a rea-
sonable belief that she was faced with an iiminent threat of death or
49 Abbott, 36 N.J. at 72, 174 A.2d at 885.
50 Id. at 72, 174 A.2d at 886.
" See Diliberto, A Violent Death, A Haunted Life, PEOPLE, Oct. 8, 1984, at 100
(describing the case of Francine Hughes, who set fire to the bed in which her husband,
who had repeatedly abused her, was sleeping).
11 See State v. Patri, No. 78-187-CR (Wis. Ct. App. Dec. 19, 1980) (LEXIS,
States library, Wis. file), discussed infra notes 57-61 and accompanying text. See gen-
erally Schneider, supra note 5, at 634 ("Homicides committed by battered women fre-
quently occur with a time lag, while the man is asleep or while his back is turned.").
See, e.g., People v. Lucas, 160 Cal. App. 2d 305, 324 P.2d 933 (1958) (defend-
ant convicted of manslaughter for shooting her husband after an argument during
which he threatened to kill her); People v. White, 90 Ill. App. 3d 1067, 414 N.E.2d 196
(1980) (defendant convicted of voluntary manslaughter for shooting her husband who
had previously beaten her); Patri, No. 78-187-CR (defendant convicted of manslaugh-
ter, apparently on the basis of evidence indicating that she shot her husband, who had
abused her, in the back).
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serious bodily harm. Imminence does not mean inevitability or cer-
tainty; the fact that a battered woman might be in certain danger of
having death or serious bodily injury inflicted upon her by the batterer
at some future time is not legally relevant to a claim of self-defense as
that defense is currently construed. Rather, the relevant factor is the
circumstances at the particular instant in which the killing took place."M
As one court has observed: "[T]hreats alone, unaccompanied by some
act which induces in defendant a reasonable belief that bodily injury is
about to be inflicted, do not justify a homicide. The danger which justi-
fies homicide must be imminent and a mere fear that danger will be-
come imminent is not enough."
55
The rationale behind the restrictive definition of imminence is ob-
vious. As long as the threatened acts of violence are only anticipated
future events, avenues of prevention or escape might be open to the
defendant. Even if avenues of escape are not available when the danger
of future harm is first perceived, they may become available before the
anticipated violence occurs.56 Furthermore, the threatened harm might
never occur and, even if it does, it might not rise to a level justifying the
use of deadly force in response. Accordingly, a defendant asserting a
claim of self-defense must show that death or serious bodily injury was
imminent at the particular instant at which the killing occurred.
The consequences for the battered woman of the rigid definition of
self-defense are illustrated by the case of State v. Patri,5 7 in which a
woman whose husband had physically and sexually abused her repeat-
edly, and had threatened her life several times, was convicted of man-
slaughter despite her claim of self-defense. While there was significant
disagreement at trial concerning the exact circumstances of the killing,"8
See People v. Dillon, 24 Ill. 2d 122, 126, 180 N.E.2d 503, 504 (1962); see also
White, 90 Ill. App. 3d at 1072, 414 N.E.2d at 200 ("[T]he issue of self-defense should
be determined by the trier of fact upon the evidence of what transpired during the
'particular instant' in which the death was caused."). See generally Rittenmeyer, supra
note 11, at 391 (stating that judges and scholars have consistently interpreted "immi-
nence" as referring to present rather than future danger).
51 Lucas, 160 Cal. App. 2d at 310, 324 P.2d at 936 (citations omitted). See gener-
ally Note, supra note 10, at 651 ("A threat of harm, no matter how certain, that is
unsupported by the assailant's present ability to carry out that threat -is not imminent
and would not justify the use of defensive force.").
56 See W. LAFAvE & A. Scorr, supra note 37, at 458; Rittenmeyer, supra note
11, at 391.
5' State v. Patri, No. 78-187-CR (Wis. Ct. App. Dec. 19, 1980) (LEXIS, States
library, Wis. file).
The testimony that Mrs. Patri presented at trial, if believed, would have cre-
ated a strong case for acquittal under the traditional formulation of self-defense. Mrs.
Patri testified that during an argument in the kitchen her husband threatened her with
a knife and followed her as she fled into the basement, where she picked up a shotgun.
Mrs. Patri claimed that she shot her husband as he threatened to "shut [her] up once
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the jury apparently believed a statement made by Mrs. Patri shortly
after the shooting: she told the sheriff that she had shot her husband in
the back as he was leaving the couple's kitchen after a heated argu-
ment.59 Mrs. Patri claimed to have reloaded the gun, shot him again in
the head, and then buried the body in a nearby shed, which she then
set afire.60 Despite testimony that Mr. Patri had menaced his wife with
a knife during the argument and had repeated his threat to kill her,6"
the jury apparently refused to find that the imminence requirement had
been met in a situation in which the victim was walking away from the
defendant at the time of the killing.
Neither the facts in the Patri case nor its result is atypical. For
example, People v. White62 and People v. Lucas3 involved defendants
who shot their husbands shortly after arguments in which the husbands
had either beaten them or threatened to kill them. In each case, the
defendant pleaded self-defense, yet she was convicted of manslaugh-
ter. 4 It would appear, then, that under the existing law of self-defense
a battered woman will not be justified in killing her batterer solely
because death or serious bodily injury is likely to be inflicted in the
future.65 A battered woman who killed her batterer while he was
asleep or while his back was turned 6 could not have had a reasonable
and for all" while advancing towards her with the knife. Id. Although the jury appar-
ently did not find this testimony persuasive, it should be noted that there was no evi-
dence that the shooting took place in the kitchen, and at least some corroborating evi-
dence that it occurred in the basement. See id. Regardless of where the shooting took
place, however, there was strong corrobative evidence that Mr. Patri was shot in the
back. See id.
59 See id.
60 See id. In a separate trial, Mrs. Patri was acquitted of an arson charge on the
ground of temporary insanity. See id.
01 See supra note 58.
6 90 Ill. App. 3d 1067, 414 N.E.2d 196 (1980) (The defendant, who previously
had been beaten by her husband, shot him once as he came through the dining room
toward the bedroom and subsequently shot him twice more.).
63 160 Cal. App. 2d 305, 324 P.2d 933 (1958) (The defendant, who had been
physically abused by her husband for over five years, repeatedly shot her husband as he
sat in a chair after an argument during which he had threatened to kill her.).
" See Lucas, 160 Cal. App. 2d at 310, 324 P.2d at 936; White, 90 Ill. App. 3d at
1068, 414 N.E.2d at 196.
61 Several commentators have argued that the law of self-defense should be inter-
preted or modified to embrace situations such as those discussed in this section. See,
e.g., Comment, supra note 2, at 926-30; Note, supra note 10, at 658-60. Until such
modification does occur, see Rittenmeyer, supra note 11, at 392 (arguing that changes
in the law of self-defense should be made not by the courts but by the legislatures),
these situations must be analyzed in light of the present requirements for a successful
claim of self-defense.
" If, however, the batterer's back was turned only briefly during an attack on the
woman, then the woman could have reasonably believed that death or serious bodily
injury was imminent.
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belief that she faced an imminent threat of death or serious bodily
harm. Her self-defense claim is therefore likely to be unsuccessful.
III. TEMPORARY INSANITY: AN ALTERNATIVE DEFENSE
This section argues that a temporary insanity defense is a viable
option for a woman who, while suffering from the effects of the bat-
tered woman syndrome, has killed her batterer. Such a defense should
be considered by the defendant and her attorney6 7 when the circum-
stances surrounding the killing were such that there are serious doubts
regarding the efficacy of a self-defense claim.
A. The Test of Insanity
One widely accepted 68 formulation of the insanity standard is
presented by the Model Penal Code (the "Code"). The Code provides
that "[a] person is not responsible for criminal conduct if at the time of
such conduct as a result of mental disease or defect [s]he lacks substan-
tial capacity either to appreciate the criminality [wrongfulness] . . . of
[her]... conduct or to conform [her] ... conduct to the requirements of
law."'69 Under this test, if interpreted and applied consistently with the
intentions of its drafters and the numerous state and federal courts that
have adopted it, evidence establishing the presence of the battered wo-
man syndrome will be extremely relevant and helpful in presenting an
insanity defense for a battered woman. The Code presents a flexible
and expansive test of insanity that allows the jury to obtain "a complete
picture of the defendant's state of mind . . . [and to] consider all rele-
vant facts pertaining to the defendant's mental state at the time the act
67 A threshold question that the defendant and her attorney, with the help of ex-
perts, must consider is whether this particular woman who has killed her batterer was
suffering from the battered woman syndrome. For a brief discussion of other attorney-
client considerations involved in deciding whether to present a temporary insanity de-
fense, see infra note 101.
" The Model Penal Code test of insanity has been adopted by a substantial num-
ber of states and a majority of federal circuits. See Note, Criminal Responsibility:
Changes in the Insanity Defense and the "Guilty But Mentally Ill" Response, 21
WASHBURN L.J. 515, 523-24 (1982); see also Slicker, Current Perspectives on the
Insanity Defense, CASE & COM., Nov.-Dec. 1985, at 22, 28 (providing a comprehen-
sive list of states and federal circuits that have adopted the Code test in statutory or case
law). Because of its substantive benefits and wide acceptance, this Comment uses the
Code test to explore the presentation of an insanity defense for a battered woman who
has killed her batterer. For a discussion of the tests of insanity in jurisdictions that have
not adopted the Code test, see W. LAFAvE & A. ScoTr, supra note 37, at 304-30;
Note, supra, at 517-22.
69 MODEL PENAL CODE § 4.01(1) (1962).
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was committed."170 The Code test therefore allows a defendant to place
before the jury evidence concerning the battering relationship in gen-
eral, the typical effects that such a relationship has upon the state of
mind of a battered woman, and the specific effects of that relationship
upon the particular defendant.
B. Temporary Insanity and the Battered Woman Syndrome
As discussed in Part I, the psychological effects of the battering
relationship upon a battered woman are numerous and often more dev-
astating than the physical abuse inflicted upon her. Ultimately, a bat-
tered woman's judgment is adversely affected by the constant failure of
her attempts to improve her relationship with the batterer.7 1 Her im-
paired judgment provides the foundation for a temporary insanity de-
fense. The basic premise of such a defense would be that the defendant,
at the time of the killing, suffered from severe stress and an impaired
mental state as a result of the battering relationship, and that this im-
paired mental state caused her to kill the batterer. The causal link be-
tween the woman's impaired mental state and the killing can be estab-
lished by showing that the woman viewed her predicament from a
psychologically distorted perspective and thus was unable to perceive
her.options72 accurately, or by showing that the "woman was driven to
the breaking point by the circumstances of her situation" ' and there-
fore was substantially unable "to conform [her] conduct to the require-
ments of law.
'" 7 4
It is important to recognize that, as used in the Code, the phrase
"mental disease or defect" represents a legal concept rather than a de-
fined medical term. Courts construing this phrase have found that it
does not refer to any technical or "ad hoc definitions or conclusions as
to what experts state is a [mental] disease or defect"75 and that it "was
not intended to designate any specific form or forms or medical classifi-
cations of mental disease."17  In fact, such a technical construction
70 Hill v. State, 252 Ind. 601, 617, 251 N.E.2d 429, 438 (1969) (discussing the
beneficial aspects of the Code test of insanity).
71 See L. WALKER 1979, supra note 2, at 42-54.
72 See supra note 35 and accompanying text.
73 Schneider & Jordan, Representation of Women Who Defend Themselves in Re-
sponse to Physical or Sexual Assault, 4 WOMEN'S RTs. L. REP. 149, 160 (1978).
71 MODEL PENAL CODE § 4.01(1) (1962).
75 McDonald v. United States, 312 F.2d 847, 851 (D.C. Cir. 1962); see also
United States v. Brawner, 471 F.2d 969, 983-84 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (adopting the Model
Penal Code formulation of the insanity defense while retaining the definition of mental
disease or defect supplied in McDonald).
7s State v. Garrett, 391 S.W.2d 235, 239 (Mo. 1965) (commenting on the mean-
ing of the phrase "mental disease or defect" as used in the Missouri statute, which
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would rob the court of its primary duty in evaluating the defense. 7
The court's primary inquiry is not whether the defendant suffered from
a clinical condition, but whether she suffered from "any abnormal con-
dition of the mind which substantially affects mental or emotional
processes and substantially impairs behavior controls."
'7 8
The legal concept of "mental disease or defect," therefore, clearly
encompasses the battered woman syndrome as it has been defined by
Dr. Walker and others. The battered woman's strong emotional attach-
ment to and dependence upon her batterer, combined with the "learned
helplessness" ' developed as a result of repeated beatings and reinforced
by her failure to escape from each successive beating,80 lead to percep-
tual distortions that alter the woman's mental and emotional processes.
A woman attempting to establish that an impairment of her mental
state resulted from recurrent beatings will be able to bolster her defense
with evidence that battered women in general are themselves more
prone to violence while in a battering relationship81 and sometimes suf-
fer from other mental health problems which are causally linked to the
battering relationship. 82 Furthermore, it appears that many battered
women who kill their batterers are not cognizant of the fact that they
have killed until informed of this fact by a third person."8 Evidence that
a battered woman was not immediately aware that she had killed her
batterer should be very helpful in establishing a defense of temporary
insanity on the ground that the defendant did not know what she was
doing and thus was unable "to appreciate the criminality . . . of [her]
conduct."'" As one mental health official has noted, "The women who
strike back finally ... are the type of persons who could argue inno-
cence under the insanity defense. In all too many cases,.., they under-
stand little of their actions, but rather take on the characteristics of a
provides for a test of insanity substantially similar to the Code test).
' See United States v. Freeman, 357 F.2d 606, 622 (2d Cir. 1966) ("[A] test
which permits all to stand or fall upon the labels or classifications employed by testify-
ing psychiatrists hardly affords the court the opportunity to perform its duty of render-
ing an independent legal and social judgment.").
71 McDonald, 312 F.2d at 851.
11 See supra notes 32-33 and accompanying text.
so This failure to escape can be traced to several of the characteristics of a typical
battered woman, such as emotional dependence on the batterer and the belief that the
situation will eventually improve. See L. WALKER 1979, supra note 2, at 65.
Si See L. WALKER 1984, supra note 8, at 149-50.
8 See id. at 123.
'3 See L. WALKER 1979, supra note 2, at 53 (Battered women interviewed by Dr.
Walker "all stated they had no idea that they had killed [their batterers] until the
police informed them" of what they had done.).
MODEL PENAL CODE § 4.01(1) (1962).
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borderline psychotic." 8 5
Another beneficial characteristic of the Code test is that it not only
takes into account the impairment of cognitive capabilities, but it also
recognizes a defense on the basis of impairment of volitional capacity."8
Under the Code, criminal responsibility is not imposed when the de-
fendant, at the time the act in question was committed, lacked "sub-
stantial capacity . . . to conform [her] conduct to the requirements of
law." 1 7 The Code's formulation of the legal standard of insanity has
two advantages over the older, increasingly unpopular8s "irresistible
impulse"89 test. First, the Code requires only substantial rather than
complete impairment of cognition or volition. As its drafters recognized,
"Nothing makes the inquiry into responsibility more unreal . . than
limitation of the issue to some ultimate extreme of total incapacity ....
The law must recognize that when there is no black or white it must
content itself with different shades of gray."90
Under the Code test, therefore, it is unnecessary for a battered
woman's volitional capacity to have been totally impaired at the time of
the killing; she must only have lacked substantial capacity to conform
her conduct to the requirements of law. The fact that she may have
been able to function in some aspects of her life-for example, in car-
ing for her children-does not necessarily preclude the possibility of
presenting a successful insanity defense. It may be argued that, al-
though she retained some capacity to function adequately in many as-
pects of her daily life, the battered woman did lack substantial capacity
to control her behavior any longer in dealing with the batterer: as to
this aspect of her life, she was "driven to the breaking point."'"
85 Meyers, supra note 3, at 48-49 (quoting Dr. Anne Seiden of the Illinois
Mental Health Department).
86 See MODEL PENAL CODE § 4.01 comment at 157 (Tent. Draft No. 4, 1955);
see also State v. Dyer, 10 Or. App. 247, 251, 518 P.2d 184, 186 (1974) (asserting that
Oregon's insanity test is satisfied by a showing of "substantial incapacity to appreciate
criminal conduct"); State v. Johnson, 121 R.I. 254, 262, 399 A.2d 469, 476 (1979)
(recognizing that the Code provides for a defense on the ground of impairment of voli-
tional capacity).
87 MODEL PENAL CODE § 4.01(1) (1962).
" See, e.g., Hill v. State, 252 Ind. 601, 608, 251 N.E.2d 429, 433-36 (1969)
(rejecting the irresistible impulse test and other tests in favor of the more modem Code
test); Johnson, 121 R.I. at 263, 399 A.2d at 474 (noting that many jurisdictions have
abandoned the traditional tests in favor of the Code test). See generally MODEL PENAL
CODE § 4.01 comment at 157 (Tent. Draft No. 4, 1955) ("The draft ... accepts the
criticism of the 'irresistible impulse' formulation as inept in so far as it may be im-
pliedly restricted as to sudden spontaneous acts as distinguished from [acts] accompa-
nied by brooding or reflection.").
, This test is described in W. LAFAVE & A. ScoTT, supra note 37, at 310-17.
o MODEL PENAL CODE § 4.01 comment at 158 (Tent. Draft No. 4, 1955).
91 Schneider & Jordan, supra note 73, at 160.
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The second advantage of the Code test is that, in contrast to the
irresistible impulse test, it does not convey the "narrow and . . . mis-
leading implication that [the] crime ... must have been perpetrated in
a sudden and explosive fit."92 The Code test, therefore, does not restrict
the insanity defense solely to "sudden, momentary or spontaneous
acts"; 93 it also acknowledges that mental illness may be characterized
by brooding or reflection."4 As a result, an insanity defense under the
Code remains a viable option for a woman who has killed her batterer
in circumstances under which her actions could not be described as sud-
den, momentary, or spontaneous-such as when he was asleep or had
his back turned. Although it would be detrimental to the success of a
self-defense claim, the fact that the woman was not responding to an
imminent threat of death or serious bodily injury, or that she may have
reflected for some time upon her course of action, is not necessarily
detrimental to the success of an insanity defense under the Code.
The advantages of the Code test discussed above make insanity an
especially appropriate defense for a battered woman. A battered wo-
man defendant can argue that successive repetitions of the battering cy-
cle drove her to the mental breaking point, rendering her substantially
unable to conform her conduct to the requirements of law. Several of
the common characteristics of battered women provide support for this
argument. Battered women often experience severe stress reactions that
produce many different physical and psychological effects.95 In some
cases, the psychological problems even lead to suicide.9" If the impaired
mental state of these women can provoke suicide, certainly it can and
does provoke homicide. Indeed, "[s]ome women, at the last second
before killing themselves . . . [turn] their rage against their tormen-
tor."97 The fact that some battered women attempt suicide as a means
of escaping a battering relationship is cogent evidence of the extent to
which battered women may be blinded to lawful methods of resolving
their predicament or may be substantially unable to take advantage of
any such methods available to them. For many battered women, kill-
2 United States v. Freeman, 357 F.2d 606, 620 (2d Cir. 1966).
" State v. Nuetzel, 61 Haw. 531, 540, 606 P.2d 920, 926 (1980) (criticizing the
irresistible impulse test).
9 See id; see also Freeman, 357 F.2d at 620-21 (arguing in favor of the Code
test, recognizing that the irresistible impulse test has not been satisfied in "numerous
instances of crimes committed after excessive brooding and melancholy by one who is
unable to resist sustained psychic compulsion or to make any real attempt to control his
conduct").
" See L. WALKER 1979, supra note 2, at 72.
"See L. OKUM, WOMAN ABUSE, FAcas REPLACING MYTHs 73, 106-07 (1986);
L. WALKER 1979, supra note 2, at 72.
97L. WALKER 1984, supra note 8, at 40.
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ing-whether suicide or homicide-appears to be the necessary resolu-
tion. Under the Code test, a strong argument can be made that criminal
responsibility should not be imposed for actions taken by a person in
the confused, tormented mental state that afflicts a battered woman.
Battered women have had at least some success in relying on a
defense of temporary insanity. The case of State v. Patri98 illustrates
how a temporary insanity defense might succeed in situations in which
a self-defense claim would be likely to fail. Despite a claim of self-
defense, Mrs. Patri, a battered wife, was convicted of manslaughter for
killing her husband. In a separate trial, however, Mrs. Patri, who had
set fire to the shed in which she had buried her husband, was acquitted
of an arson charge on the ground of temporary insanity.99 Defense
counsel obviously was able to prove that Mrs. Patri was legally insane
at the time she set the fire, which occurred only a short time after the
killing. It is possible, therefore, that if an insanity defense had been
presented at the manslaughter trial, the trier of fact would have acquit-
ted Mrs. Patri of all charges.
An even more powerful illustration of the potency of a defense of
temporary insanity is provided by the acquittal of Francine Hughes.
Mrs. Hughes had been physically and sexually abused by her husband
for fourteen years. One night, as her husband slept after another epi-
sode of physical and sexual abuse, Mrs. Hughes poured gasoline
around the bed and then burned her husband to death. At trial, Mrs.
Hughes was acquitted by reason of temporary insanity,100 despite the
fact that the killing appears to have involved some reflection insofar as
it took at least some planning for her to obtain the gasoline and set the
fire. In short, the Hughes killing is typical of the situation described
above in which a self-defense claim is likely to fail because the immi-
nence requirement is not satisfied. Mrs. Hughes' success in asserting
temporary insanity in such a situation should strongly encourage de-
fendants in similar situations and their counsel to present a temporary
insanity defense. 01
O No. 78-187-CR (Wis. Ct. App. Dec. 19, 1980) (LEXIS, States library, Wis.
file). This case is discussed more fully above. See supra notes 57-61 and accompanying
text.
"See id.
1'0 See Diliberto, supra note 51, at 100 (describing Mrs. Hughes' trial).
101 The decision to raise such a defense will, of course, have to be made by the
defendant in conjunction with her attorney after analyzing the facts of her particular
case. In situations wherein a traditional claim of self-defense is unlikely to succeed,
however, it is essential that the defendant be informed of all the relevant aspects of the
insanity defense. While the defense is frowned upon by some as stigmatizing the wo-
man, in situations in which a self-defense claim is not a viable option it may be a
tactical necessity to present an insanity defense when there is at least the possibility of
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IV. BEYOND AN INSANITY ACQUITTAL
The previous section argued that under circumstances in which a
claim of self-defense is likely to be unsuccessful, a battered woman who
has killed her batterer should consider seeking an acquittal by reason of
temporary insanity. Because many states provide procedures for postac-
quittal commitment of insanity acquittees to a mental health facility, an
insanity acquittal is not the equivalent of an acquittal on the grounds of
self-defense. Therefore, when evaluating the merits of presenting an
insanity defense, a defendant and her counsel must consider the possi-
bility of postacquittal commitment. This section of the Comment exam-
ines the involuntary commitment of persons acquitted by reason of in-
sanity and concludes that a battered woman who has killed her batterer
and then successfully presented an insanity defense often will be in a
good position to avoid such commitment. Furthermore, even those
women who are unable to avoid commitment should be able to obtain a
prompt release or qualify for less restrictive means of confine-
ment-such as outpatient treatment-in states that provide alternatives
to commitment to a state mental health facility.
A. Mandatory Commitment
A minority of states have enacted statutes that require commitment
of persons acquitted by reason of insanity.10 2 In these states, a battered
woman will not be able to avoid commitment entirely. The Kansas
Criminal Code, for example, requires: "When a person is acquitted on
the ground that the person was insane at the time of the commission of
the alleged crime, the verdict shall be not guilty because of insanity and
its success. As one article has noted, "[T]he defense attorney has responsibility to re-
present the alleged criminal while she ...is being processed through the criminal
justice system. Not to avail oneself of every possible advantage in the construction of a
defense would be to fall short of this obligation to the defendant." Pasewark & Craig,
Insanity Plea: Defense Attorney's Views, 8 J. PSYCHIATRY & L. 413, 440 (1980).
The decision whether to present a temporary insanity defense is ultimately the
defendant's. She may not feel stigmatized, or may deem any possible attendant stigmati-
zation to be irrelevant or immaterial in the broader scope of presenting a defense to a
criminal charge. One study of defendants who had raised insanity defenses found that
the vast majority were amenable to its use, with only a small percentage raising even an
initial objection concerning stigma. See id. at 432. This study seems to suggest that a
defendant is not likely to consider the potential stigma attendant to the presentation of
an insanity defense as a deterrent to raising the defense.
"02 For statutes calling for some form of mandatory commitment of those acquitted
by reason of insanity, see, for example, GA. CODE ANN. § 17-7-131(d) (Supp. 1985);
IND. CODE ANN. § 35-36-2-4 (West 1986); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 22-3428(1) (1981 &
Supp. 1986); ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 103 (1980); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 552.040
(Vernon Supp. 1986); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 23A-26-12 (Supp. 1986).
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the person shall be committed to the state security hospital for safe-
keeping and treatment." 10 3 The justification offered for statutes that re-
quire mandatory commitment after an insanity acquittal is that once it
has been established that the defendant was mentally ill and dangerous
at the time the crime was committed, it should be presumed that the
defendant's condition is of a continuing nature.'" In fact, some statutes
expressly establish this presumption.' 5
Mandatory commitment statutes, while usually upheld against
constitutional challenges,' 06 are based on several presumptions that
have little basis in fact. First, the rationale for mandatory commitment
statutes presumes that an acquittal by reason of insanity establishes
that the defendant was proven to have been suffering from a mental
disease or defect at the time of the trial. This presumption, however, is
particularly inapposite in those jurisdictions that place the burden of
proof of sanity upon the prosecution once the defendant has placed her
sanity in issue. An insanity acquittal in such jurisdictions may mean
only that there was a reasonable doubt as to the defendant's sanity and
not that she was shown to have been insane even at the time of the
act. 0 7 Although some jurisdictions apparently assume that the presen-
tation of an insanity defense amounts to an admission by the defendant
of dangerous mental illness, 08 this assumption appears to be more a
post hoc rationalization than an actual indication of the significance of
a defendant's use of the insanity defense. In such jurisdictions, there-
fore, mandatory commitment is inappropriate: before a person acquit-
ted by reason of insanity is committed to a mental health facility, there
should be adequate proof that she is presently mentally ill or
dangerous.
Furthermore, even if an insanity acquittal does establish that the
defendant was mentally ill at the time of the act in question, it offers
little insight into the mental state of the defendant at the time of her
acquittal. Mandatory commitment jurisdictions presume that the de-
18 KAN. STAT. ANN. § 22-3428(1) (1981 & Supp. 1986).
104 See, e.g., In re Downing, 103 Idaho 689, 696, 652 P.2d 193, 200 (1982) (rec-
ognizing, and citing other cases which have also recognized, the presumption that an
insanity acquittee's mental condition at the time of the act is of a continuing nature).
108 See, e.g., KAN. STAT. ANN. § 22-3428(1) (1981 & Supp. 1986).
104 See, e.g., People v. Chavez, 629 P.2d 1040 (Colo. 1981) (concluding that auto-
matic commitment of a defendant found not guilty by reason of insanity does not violate
due process of law); Downing, 103 Idaho at 689, 652 P.2d at 193 (upholding the con-
stitutionality of mandatory commitment statutes). See generally W. LAFAVE & A.
Scorr, supra note 37, at 362-63 (reviewing the constitutional arguments regarding
mandatory commitment statutes).
107 See Note, Commitment Following an Insanity Acquittal, 94 HARV. L. REv.
605, 611 (1981).
108 See Downing, 103 Idaho at 696, 652 P.2d at 200.
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fendant's mental disability is of a continuing nature but offer no empir-
ical support for this presumption. Moreover, because no inquiry is
made as to whether the disorder from which the defendant suffered at
the time of the act "was of the sort which is likely to have contin-
ued," 109 the presumption is applied with complete disregard for factual
underpinnings. This presumption, then, ignores the wide variety of
mental disorders that could give rise to a successful insanity defense.110
In addition, the longer the delay between the act and the verdict, the
weaker the presumption of continuing insanity.11 It is essential, there-
fore, that an inquiry into whether the defendant's mental disorder was
of a continuing nature be made in every case.
Finally, the failure to inquire into the particular disorder suffered
by the defendant is to some extent inconsistent with the basic rationale
for mandatory commitment. Mandatory commitment of insanity acquit-
tees is usually justified in terms of preventive detention: a defendant
who has committed an otherwise criminal act while insane is a threat to
society.1 21 Even assuming that the defendant's insanity is of a continu-
ing nature, however, the defendant has not necessarily been shown to
be dangerous. While there is an increasing tendency for states to limit
involuntary commitment to situations in which a mentally ill person
poses a threat to herself or others,"1 many states require commitment if
the person is either mentally ill or dangerous. In those states,
mandatory commitment would operate to "protect" society even from
acquittees who have never been shown to be dangerous.11 '
Perhaps because of their potential shortcomings, mandatory com-
mitment statutes usually provide safeguards against continued unneces-
sary commitment of insanity acquittees 5 Even absent such safeguards,
two factors weigh heavily in favor of a battered woman being able to
establish her sanity as soon as state law provides her with the opportu-
109 A. GOLDSTEIN, THE INSANITY DEFE sE 144 (1967).
11 See Note, supra note 107, at 610.
m See Figinski, Commitment After Acquittal on Grounds of Insanity, 22 MD. L.
REv. 293, 301 (1962).
"' See Note, supra note 107, at 606-07.
118 See Developments in the Law-Civil Commitment of the Mentally Ill, 87
HARV. L. REv. 1190, 1202-04 (1974); see also Note, supra note 107, at 607-08 ("In
general a state will not commit someone to a mental hospital without proof that he is
mentally ill and dangerous to himself or others.").
114 It should be noted that this section of the Comment is discussing the shortcom-
ings of mandatory commitment as it is applied to all insanity acquittees, not just those
acquitted of a charge of homicide or other violent crime. Of course, in the latter situa-
tion the requisite dangerousness would be proved.
I15 See, e.g., Mo. ANN. STAT. § 552.040.4 (Vernon Supp. 1986) (providing that
an insanity acquittee, while automatically committed, is entitled to a hearing within 60
days).
1987)
448 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW
nity. First, a significant amount of time often will have passed between
the commission of the act in question and the commitment hearing. The
longer the interval between the act and the commitment hearing, the
less support there will be for the inference that the woman is currently
mentally ill or dangerous and hence a suitable candidate for commit-
ment. The fact that she will have received treatment during her postac-
quittal commitment and may have received counseling before and dur-
ing the trial adds support to the argument that the threat, if any, that a
battered woman poses to herself or society will dissipate with the pas-
sage of time. Secondly, in a very real sense, it can be argued that the
"tact itself [the killing] may have effected a 'cure' of the problem." ' 6
The woman's act was occasioned by a particular stress, the source of
which has been eliminated by means of the act itself. Thus, there is
"little likelihood of subsequent criminal acts." 117 Once the woman is
free of the battering relationship, there is usually a marked improve-
ment in her mental health.""' Indeed, her mental health "must often
[improve] before [she] is ... competent to stand trial."119 Mental health
officials have noted that "when the situation of stress is relieved...
these women's disordered and unusual behavior disappears. The
women return to acting very normally, usually exceptionally agreeable
and conforming. 1 20 By the very nature of the battered woman syn-
drome and the battering relationship, then, a strong argument can be
made that the battered woman acquitted by reason of insanity poses no
threat to herself or to the health, safety, or property of others. The
mental impairment of a battered woman is not "of the sort which is
likely to have continued."
121
B. Discretionary Involuntary Commitment
Because most states have enacted statutes that provide trial courts
with varying degrees. of discretion in determining whether a defendant
who has been acquitted by reason of insanity should be committed to a
mental health facility, a battered woman insanity acquittee often will
be able to avoid commitment altogether. While some states provide for
116 Note, Acquittal By Reason of Insanity: Is Mandatory Commitment Constitu-
tional?, 39 UMKC L. REv. 213, 217 (1970-71).
117 Id.
1 8 See Meyers, supra note 3, at 49; see also L. WALKER 1984, supra note 8, at
149-50 (noting that battered women were less prone to commit violent acts when they
were not living in a battering relationship).
" Note, supra note 107, at 611.
180 Meyers, supra note 3, at 49 (discussing the views of Dr. Anne Seiden of the
Illinois Mental Health Department).
'll A. GOLDSTEIN, supra note 109, at 144.
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formal commitment proceedings at the end of a defendant's criminal
trial,1 2 2 and others require a separate civil commitment proceed-
ing, 2 most states allow the criminal trial court to confine an insanity
acquittee pending a more thorough determination of her present mental
condition.
1 2 4
In almost all nonmandatory commitment states,125 an insanity ac-
quittee will not be committed unless the state can make the same show-
ing by clear and convincing evidence of present mental illness or dan-
gerousness that it is required 126  to make in civil commitment
proceedings. In Alabama, for example, the trial court must decide
whether there is probable cause to believe that an insanity acquittee is
presently mentally ill and dangerous. If probable cause is found to ex-
ist, the acquittee is temporarily confined pending the outcome of a sep-
arate commitment hearing; otherwise, she is released. 127 Other states,
such as Florida, employ a similar procedure in which the trial court
itself can commit the acquittee, but only after finding that she is pres-
ently manifestly dangerous.128 States such as Pennsylvania, 29 wherein
12 See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 12.47.090(c) (1984) (requiring an insanity acquit-
tee to prove by clear and convincing evidence that she no longer suffers from a mental
illness which could cause a danger to the public); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 916.15 (West
1985) (requiring that a court find an insanity acquittee "manifestly dangerous" before
ordering involuntary commitment); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:4-8(a-b) (West 1982) (pro-
viding that the commitment decision is to be made after a psychiatric examination by a
doctor of the prosecutor's choice).
113 For example, see ARIz. R. CRIM. P. 25; PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 50, § 7406 (Pur-
don Supp. 1986), each of which provides that a petition must be filed for a separate
civil commitment proceeding.
114 See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 15-16-41 (1982) (allowing the court to order an in-
sanity acquittee into the sheriff's custody pending a hearing, provided that the court
finds probable cause to believe that the acquittee suffers from a mental illness and
therefore poses a danger to herself or the public); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 41-612(1)(a)
(Supp. 1983) (permitting a court to confine, prior to a commitment hearing, an acquit-
tee who it finds may be dangerous to others); CAL. PENAL CODE § 1026(b) (West
1985 & Supp. 1986) (allowing the court to remand custody of the defendant to the
sheriff pending a final determination with respect to sanity if it appears to the court
that the defendant has recovered completely); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 123,
§ 16(a-b) (West 1981) (requiring that a court order commitment pending a full com-
mitment hearing); N.C. GrN. STAT. § 15A-1321 (1983 & Supp. 1985) (recognizing a
court's discretion to initiate civil commitment proceedings and to issue custody orders
pending such proceedings); S.C. CODE ANN. § 44-23-610 (Law. Co-op. 1976) (al-
lowing a court discretion to initiate civil commitment proceedings and to issue hospitali-
zation orders pending such proceedings); Tax. CODE. CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 46.03(d)
(Vernon Supp. 1986) (requiring the court to order commitment proceedings, and al-
lowing the court to order confinement pending a hearing within 30 days, if the defend-
ant is acquitted of a crime involving threat of serious bodily injury).
112 Alaska is an exception in that it places the burden of proof on the party oppos-
ing commitment. See ALASKA STAT. § 12.47.090(c) (1984).
126 See Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 431-33 (1979).
227 See ALA. CODE § 15-16-41 (1982).
"" See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 916.15 (West 1985).
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the trial judge at most can order the prosecuting attorney to initiate
standard commitment proceedings, provide the greatest protection
against unnecessary commitment of persons acquitted by reason of
insanity.
It is important to note that in all of the nonmandatory commit-
ment states a battered woman insanity acquittee will be able to make
her arguments against commitment prior to any confinement in a
mental health facility. Furthermore, in the states that require the trial
court to apply the same standard as would be applied in an ordinary
civil commitment proceeding, the acquittee will benefit from the strin-
gent burden of proof imposed on the party seeking commitment."' 0 In
those states that leave the initial decision concerning temporary confine-
ment to the discretion of the trial court, the defendant will still have an
opportunity to persuade the court that she is no longer suffering from a
mental illness of sufficient severity to warrant commitment. Even if she
fails to persuade the court not to order confinement pending her com-
mitment hearing, she still will have an opportunity at the subsequent
hearing to persuade the finder of fact that there is insufficient cause to
justify her continued commitment.
An additional benefit of discretionary commitment proceedings is
that they frequently include consideration of less restrictive means of
confinement for insanity acquittees who otherwise might present diffi-
cult dilemmas for courts making commitment decisions. The availabil-
ity of conditional releases and outpatient programs provides courts with
an alternative to the polar choice between no observation or treatment
at all and full scale commitment to a state mental institution. 1 ' Be-
cause the confining nature of the battering relationship was one of the
primary factors that caused the deterioration of the battered woman's
mental health in the first place, the nonconfining nature of outpatient
treatment, in comparison with the nature of commitment to a mental
health facility, may be more appropriate therapeutically for the bat-
tered woman insanity acquittee. After an insanity acquittal, the "sole
concern is therapeutic."1 2 Furthermore, "[tireatment without hospitali-
zation is particularly suitable in cases where confinement would work
unnecessary hardship . . . and where adequate arrangements can be
1 9 See PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 50, § 7406 (Purdon Supp. 1986).
180 See supra notes 122-26 and accompanying text.
1"1 The following state statutes are among those that advance less restrictive
means of treatment and observation as alternatives to involuntary commitment: CAL.
PENAL CODE § 1026 (West 1985 & Supp. 1986); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:4-8(b)(2)
(West 1982); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 50, § 7304(f) (Purdon Supp. 1986); WAsH. REv.
CODE ANN. § 10.77.110 (1980 & Supp. 1986).
1l A. GOLDSTEIN, supra note 109, at 146.
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made for treatment in the community." ' When there are adequate
community resources for treatment, committing a woman who has
young children-as battered women often do-would work an unneces-
sary hardship. Considering the fact that most battered women are un-
likely to commit violent acts after the battering relationship ceases, as
well as the fact that many of them are also mothers with children in
need of care, the availability of noncommitment supervision may make
the difference between prolonging the family disruption caused by
spousal violence and taking the first steps toward restoring the family
to normal life.
CONCLUSION
The Legislature finds and declares that domestic violence is
a serious crime against society; that there are thousands of
persons in this State who are regularly beaten, tortured and
in some cases even killed by their spouses or cohabitants;
that a significant number of women who are assaulted are
pregnant; [and] that victims of domestic violence come from
all social and economic backgrounds and ethnic groups
"134
This statutory recognition of the widespread existence of domestic vio-
lence is potent evidence of how pervasive a problem it is. Domestic
violence often results in the death of the battered spouse, but occasion-
ally battered women kill their batterers.
These women increasingly have been relying upon self-defense as
a justification for their actions, and in many situations rightly so. In
light of the traditional formulation and interpretation of the require-
ments of the law of self-defense, however, in some situations a self-
defense plea by a battered woman who has killed her batterer is likely
to be unsuccessful. In those situations, alternative defenses should be
considered.
One potentially successful alternative defense is that of temporary
insanity. The characteristics typically exhibited by a battered woman,
collectively and commonly referred to as the battered woman syndrome,
will be of enormous significance in presenting an insanity defense. Al-
though an acquittal by reason of insanity includes the possibility of
commitment to a mental health facility, strong arguments can be made
183 Leavy, The Mentally Ill Criminal Defendant, 9 CriM. L. Buu.L. 197, 242
(1973).
1" N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C: 25-2 (West 1982).
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that such commitment is inappropriate for a battered woman. There-
fore, for a battered woman who has killed her batterer in circumstances
that do not satisfy the traditional requirements of the self-defense stan-
dard, a defense of temporary insanity is a viable alternative that should
be considered.
